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Abstract
On January 14, 2008, under the wider program of 
the Arizona Denial Prosecution Initiative, Operation 
Streamline was put into effect in the Tucson Sector of the 
Mexico-US borderlands . Initially implemented in Del 
Rio, Texas, this program—aimed at mass incarceration 
of undocumented persons to reduce repeated migration 
attempts—has been most rigorously applied in the Tucson 
Sector, known as both the busiest and deadliest corridor for 
migration . Every day approximately seventy migrants are 
apprehended by the US Border Patrol and then sentenced 
for up to 180 days imprisonment . I consider Operation 
Streamline and its impacts on undocumented migrants 
through the lens of local organizing, particularly by the 
humanitarian aid group No More Deaths, asserting that 
such policies—which further militarize the border and jus-
tify criminalization of migrants in the public eye—put bod-
ies at greater risk, even before they are prosecuted, through 
practices of spatial containment that add to the rigours 
of crossing the Sonoran Desert . In this work I explore the 
methods in which grassroots humanitarian aid groups 
apply practices of direct action to challenge such policies 
and promote freedom of movement .
Résumé
Le 14 Janvier 2008, dans le cadre de l’« Arizona Denial 
Prosecution Initiative », le programme « Operation 
Streamline » est entré en vigueur dans le secteur Tucson 
de la zone frontalière entre le Mexique et les États-Unis . 
D’abord mis en œuvre à Del Rio, Texas, ce programme 
visant l’incarcération massive des sans-papiers afin de 
réduire les tentatives répétées de migration a été le plus 
rigoureusement appliquée dans le secteur Tucson, couloir 
migratoire ayant la réputation d’être le plus achalandé et le 
plus meurtrier . Chaque jour, environ soixante-dix migrants 
sont appréhendés par la US Border Patrol, puis condamnés 
à un maximum de 180 jours d’emprisonnement . L’auteur 
considère le programme « Operation Streamline » et ses 
impacts sur les sans-papiers à travers le prisme de l’organi-
sation locale, en particulier du groupe d’aide humanitaire 
No More Deaths, affirmant que de telles politiques, qui 
militarisent davantage la frontière et justifient la crimina-
lisation des migrants au yeux du grand public, exposent les 
sans-papiers à un risque accru, avant même qu’ils soient 
traduits en justice, à travers des pratiques de confinement 
spatial qui ajoutent aux rigueurs de la traversée du désert 
de Sonora . Dans cet article, l’auteur étudie les méthodes 
par lesquelles les groupes d’aide humanitaire populaires 
font appel à la pratique de l’action directe pour contester 
ces politiques et promouvoir la liberté de mouvement .
Confining Freedom of Movement  
within the Tucson Sector
On January 14, 2008, Operation Streamline—under the 
multi-faceted program of the Arizona Denial Prosecution 
Initiative (ADPI)—came into effect within the Tucson Sector 
of the Mexico-US border . Initially implemented in Del Rio, 
Texas, in 2005, followed by Yuma, Arizona, and then Laredo, 
Texas, in 2007, this program is being most notably enforced 
in the 262-mile-wide Tucson Sector of southern Arizona . 
In a press release reporting on their successes of fiscal 
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year 2008 within the Tucson Sector, Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) stated that:
Under the Arizona Denial Prosecution Initiative, 9,563 illegal 
aliens were successfully prosecuted sending a clear message that 
there will be consequences for entering illegally into Arizona . 
ADPI assures that each defendant prosecuted faces a sentence of 
up to 180 days in jail, a formal removal and a ban on legal re-entry 
to the United States for five years .1
I argue that policies such as Operation Streamline work 
in several ways to deny freedom of movement to those seek-
ing entry into the US without documentation . Further, I 
assert that in seeking to understand the work that such poli-
cies do, it is necessary to consider the spatial implementa-
tion and operation of these policies in their efforts to deny 
freedom of movement to particular populations who are 
criminalized by their presence within certain spaces .2 The 
Tucson Sector, which is now subject to the enforcement of 
Operation Streamline and the ADPI, is known as both the 
busiest and deadliest corridor across the entire Mexico-US 
border . In 2005, 241 migrants died crossing into southern 
Arizona,3 the worst year on record . This shift of migration 
paths has created a “funneling effect,”4 in which migrants 
are channelled into more remote and harsh terrain out-
side of urban areas . Since the implementation of militar-
ization strategies such as Operation Gatekeeper were put 
into effect, large swathes of land in more hospitable areas 
of the Mexico-US borderlands have been walled off, creat-
ing new migration routes . In fiscal year 2007, prior to the 
implementation of Operation Streamline, over 378,000 
people were arrested by United States Border Patrol (USBP) 
in the Tucson Sector alone, yet fewer than one-half of one 
per cent were prosecuted, the remainder being “voluntarily 
returned .”5
Since the implementation of Operation Hold the Line in 
Ciudad Juárez/El Paso in 1993, and Operation Gatekeeper 
in Tijuana/San Diego in 1994, innumerable programs and 
policies have been put in place to restrict movement in 
this region and militarize the Mexico-US border against 
those attempting to cross without official documents .6 
Operation Streamline in the Tucson Sector represents a 
notably heightened push to further criminalize undocu-
mented migrants, with specific ties to the growing migrant 
detention industrial complex across the United States .7 I 
argue that  policies such as Operation Streamline work 
to further criminalize migrants, not only for their act of 
crossing the border outside of an official port of entry, but 
also for their presence within certain spaces .8 Further I 
argue that Operation Streamline works to criminalize and 
contain certain populations even if they are able to avoid 
apprehension, therefore serving a dual purpose . As Susan 
Bibler Coutin states in her work regarding the “spatializa-
tion of legality”:
Unauthorized immigrants who are not apprehended by US immi-
gration authorities are none the less excluded, to some degree, by 
policies that bar the undocumented from exercising certain rights 
and receiving certain services .9
In this work I seek to take this assertion a step further, rec-
ognizing the wide-ranging impacts that such practices have 
in creating and criminalizing migrant bodies . Through 
my research on, and work alongside, the humanitarian aid 
group No More Deaths, who provide assistance to migrants 
in the deserts of southern Arizona,10 I aim to demonstrate 
the methods in which such policies work to further con-
strain the ability for freedom of movement, and in many 
cases, the very right to live well before someone is appre-
hended by the USBP .
I speak here then from the position of an academic as 
well as an activist working for the freedom of movement at 
a grassroots level, drawing on a No Borders politics from 
a theoretical and practical perspective . Most important 
to my research and praxis, I consider the work of Joseph 
Nevins, who has committed himself tirelessly to exploring 
the implications of border militarization practices upon 
undocumented populations .11 Within his work, Nevins has 
put forward a particularly important challenge to academ-
ics and researchers working on issues pertaining to border 
militarization and freedom of movement . He argues that:
… it is imperative to engage in a critical dialogue about the factors 
that give rise to the fatalities [of migrants] . I assert that by not call-
ing for an end to boundary enforcement as it relates to immigra-
tion or by legitimating such enforcement, the authors [academics 
and policy analysts] are resigning themselves to migrant deaths .12
This work, then, seeks to move beyond demands for more 
“humane” border securitization and immigration policy, 
particularly in light of the ongoing adoption of humanitar-
ian discourse by the USBP and CBP as a strategy to further 
legitimize its practices of denial of freedom of movement,13 
even as the death toll continues to grow, often exceeding five 
hundred or more deaths per year .14 Within the US, current 
discourse in the popular media and by state and federal gov-
ernment has focused predominantly upon the construction 
of the simplistic binary of the “good” or productive migrant, 
versus that of the “bad” migrant, with many arguing that a 
guest-worker program or amnesty provides the answer to 
the problem of undocumented immigration into the United 
States .15 Yet as Cynthia Wright has noted, practices such 
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as amnesty, while beneficial to many living without docu-
ments and in positions of precarity16 within the bound-
aries of certain nation-states, are typically followed by a 
series of more repressive measures against future migrant 
populations .17 It is necessary, then, as other No Borders 
advocates have noted, to step beyond state-sanctioned 
methods of  determining who is “legal” and who is “illegal” 
within nation-state boundaries and recognize that as long 
as boundary enforcement and immigration controls are 
seen as legitimate, abuses and deaths of non-citizens will 
continue .18
It is important to recognize the spatial nature of a specif-
ically No Borders politics, and so I draw here upon a spatial 
perspective, including the need to understand the way in 
which policies such as Operation Streamline operate within 
and across space . Those working around critical under-
standings of space and place, in particular academic geog-
raphers in North America, have yet to effectively confront 
a specifically No Borders politics .19 Many working outside 
of this explicit discipline, however, refer commonly to the 
spatial implications of No Borders politics,20 a focus I aim 
to expand upon in this study of Operation Streamline and 
migration in the southern Arizona region .
Although it is imperative that academics across various 
fields engage with No Borders politics, to truly develop such 
an understanding we must not remain abstracted from 
those most affected by border militarization and immigra-
tion policies that seek to deny freedom of movement . This 
also includes social movements and grassroots groups that 
aim to dismantle rather than “humanize” such policies 
while working in solidarity with precarious communities . 
Through my work with grassroots groups such as No More 
Deaths that operate in the space of the Mexico-US border-
lands, I draw out the importance of bringing together these 
diverse viewpoints, recognizing the life and death implica-
tions of challenging nation-state practices that militarize 
borders and criminalize migrant populations .
It is necessary for academics to engage with such groups 
in an effort to better understand how such processes of 
militarization can be challenged in meaningful and tan-
gible ways that go beyond efforts to humanize immigration 
policy . Those who decide or are forced to cross the inter-
national boundary into the US (along with the subsequent 
journey many face before reaching the Mexico-US border) 
encounter continually worsening conditions in this region . 
Crossing in the deserts of the southwest US, migrants face 
five or more days of walking in some of the most inhos-
pitable terrain and climates possible, typically encoun-
tering abuse at the hands of “coyotes,”21 vigilante groups, 
ranchers, and USBP agents . Through the implementation 
of the Secure Border Initiative (SBI),22 migrants must also 
contend with continually developing technology aimed at 
halting their movement, including the fifty-seven proposed 
surveillance towers to be distributed throughout the desert 
landscape .23
Meanwhile certain counties in Arizona seek to further 
criminalize migrants through the adoption of new laws that 
not only prosecute smugglers but consider migrants as “co-
conspirators” in their own smuggling .24 Though the strin-
gently anti-immigration bill HR4437 was defeated in 2006 
when many millions of people took to the streets throughout 
the United States to protest its adoption,25 we are now wit-
nessing many of its demands being implemented in a piece-
meal manner . This trend can be seen at the state and local 
levels, such as through the continued growth of Operation 
Streamline, as well as at the federal level through the 2006 
Secure Fence Act .26 At the end of 2008, one of the most vio-
lent years to date in US border militarization—where 370 
miles of new fencing was added (often with disregard for 
environmental laws),27 and the USBP reached its goal of 
deploying 18,000 agents—we are at a critical juncture . The 
year 2010 has seen the continuation of the criminalization 
of undocumented migrants across the entirety of the state, 
with the controversial implementation of Arizona Senate 
Bill 1070, legislation that requires state employees to ask for 
identification from people suspected to be in the country 
without authorization .28
Operation Streamline
For approximately two hours starting each weekday at 1:30 
p .m . in the Evo A . DeConcini courthouse in downtown 
Tucson, undocumented migrants mostly from Mexico and 
Central America are criminally charged for having illegally 
entered the United States . Of the approximately one thou-
sand migrants detained by US Border Patrol in this sec-
tor each day, up to seventy persons are randomly selected 
and processed through the criminal court system . Instead 
of being voluntarily returned, they face up to 180 days of 
incarceration, or longer if they have a previous record of 
deportation or aggravated felony charge . The intention is 
to create a deterrent to future crossers, reducing recidivism 
rates particularly within the area Operation Streamline is 
applied to, what the USBP refers to as “zones of zero toler-
ance .” In total, approximately five hundred of the two thou-
sand miles that constitute the Mexico-US border are now 
subject to these spaces of zero tolerance created through 
Operation Streamline .29 Three months after Operation 
Streamline’s inception in the Tucson Sector in January 2008, 
it was reported in the Arizona Daily Star that recidivism had 
dropped from 79 per cent to 46 per cent, while “recidivism 
usually ranges from 80 percent to 92 percent elsewhere in 
the Tucson Sector .”30
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From discussions with several lawyers and judges 
involved in the Operation Streamline hearings, as well as 
humanitarian aid workers, however, it became apparent 
that very few believe this policy is creating any deterrent at 
all . Yet, those who are prosecuted are left with a criminal 
conviction on their record, and will face greater difficulties 
in the future should they be detained again (up to ten years 
imprisonment) or attempt to apply for citizenship within the 
United States . Whether or not Operation Streamline can be 
directly attributed to a decrease in current and future bor-
der crossings, it is important to recognize the wider impacts 
that it creates .
Geography is central to the application of Operation 
Streamline as it is a spatially applied practice of deny-
ing freedom of movement . Migrants found to be crossing 
within a specific corridor in the Tucson Sector are suscept-
ible to being placed within the Streamline process, and in 
turn are criminalized more stringently than others commit-
ting the same act elsewhere along the border . Although it 
has been unable to effectively do so, CBP and USBP have 
set out to create these zones of zero tolerance, resulting in 
particularly unforgiving spaces along the border that are 
continually expanding, leading to a specific geography of 
Operation Streamline being created .
It is difficult to determine the exact scope of Operation 
Streamline’s spatial reach in the Tucson Sector . Early in its 
inception, USBP spokespersons stated that the Operation 
Streamline corridor was fifteen miles wide .31 Yet in a later 
interview with another USBP spokesperson it was noted 
that “any apprehension made anywhere in the Tucson Sector 
is subject to prosecution under the program .”32 At the 
close of 2008, it was then stated that Operation Streamline 
applies to 132 miles of the 262-mile sector that spans from 
Yuma County to the border of New Mexico .33 This fluctu-
ating range also represents the ability for policies such as 
Operation Streamline to expand as necessary, particularly in 
response to the dynamic nature of migration paths as certain 
routes effectively become shut down due to USBP presence 
as well as other factors that also affect migration levels .
During the summer of 2008, whilst conducting field-
work in southern Arizona, I attended Operation Streamline 
hearings in Tucson along with several other local humani-
tarian aid workers, as part of their practice of witnessing .34 
Although I had heard a great deal from fellow immigrant 
rights activists about the way in which the proceedings 
occurred, I was still unprepared for what I would encounter . 
Courtrooms—not unlike other highly regulated spaces—
have a tendency to feel the same as any other courtroom: 
sterile, mundane, and overly formal . The courtroom in 
which Operation Streamline hearings take place is no dif-
ferent, until you look to your left upon entering and notice 
the seventy or so people seated in rows, shackled at the feet 
and hands . The majority is male, though typically ten or so 
of the detainees are female . Most appear to be in their twen-
ties or thirties, though some are barely a day over eighteen . 
Of those within the courtroom, most are from the south-
ern states of Mexico, though migrants from Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and Honduras are also often represented .
The sound of the shackles continually rattling as detain-
ees shift position or try to wipe tears from their eyes echoes 
within the courtroom throughout the hearing . As each 
detainee is called to plead either guilty or not guilty of 
entering undocumented/not through a legal port of entry, 
they shuffle their feet to the front of the courtroom . Many 
limp from sprained or strained ankles and tired muscles 
caused by walking through the desert, some for up to a 
week, and failing to receive proper treatment from the US 
government authorities or the private contractors who had 
detained them . All are wearing the clothes they had been 
captured in, many with tears in their shirts from walk-
ing through the unforgiving environment of the Sonoran 
Desert or from being roughly handled by USBP agents .
Most are called to the front of the courtroom, and through 
the use of an interpreter plead guilty (culpable)—the sound 
of defeat in their voices clearly evident . For those that have 
been previously caught crossing undocumented, each is 
given a sentence of between 10 and 180 days of prison time . 
The majority being convicted for their first time are typically 
given a sentence of “time served”—their day or two of incar-
ceration being sufficient in the court’s eyes—but with the 
stern warning that should they be caught again, the judge 
would not be so lenient . For those with previous depor-
tation records, and those previously sentenced through 
Operation Streamline procedures, punishment ranges from 
two to ten years . It is doubtful that most truly understand 
what they are agreeing to, often encountering the US court 
system for their first time, dealing with an interpreter, and 
being rushed through the system (each defendant is given 
one hour at most with a lawyer, shared with several other 
defendants, and the hearings typically last less than two 
hours for the entire seventy defendants) . It is not uncom-
mon for defendants to speak a language other than Spanish 
(such as an indigenous dialect), and so they are forced to 
rely on their limited Spanish skills without an interpreter . 
Further, most are told to accept pre-written deals whether 
they truly believe they are guilty or not . Significantly, to 
date almost no one has pleaded innocent to the charges .
In March of 2008, just two months after its inception, a 
proposal was made to move the public hearings of Operation 
Streamline, which take place in the federal courthouse in 
downtown Tucson, to the detention centre located on the 
Davis Monthan Air Force Base on the outskirts of the city, 
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also home to the newly built USBP headquarters .35 The move 
was proposed due to the growing strain upon the downtown 
courthouse, which faces up to one hundred migrants a day 
who must be detained . This would have resulted in moving 
the only public aspect of the Operation Streamline process 
behind detention centre walls . Through considerable pres-
sure from grassroots groups active in Tucson and elsewhere, 
the decision to move the hearings to Davis Monthan was 
dropped . Instead, they continue to take place at the federal 
courthouse from Monday to Friday every week, therefore 
remaining open to the public . In January of 2009 however, it 
was revealed by a USBP spokesperson that there is a renewed 
effort to have the hearings at the headquarters, where they 
could increase the numbers of those being prosecuted from 
seventy to one hundred or more .36
At the close of 2009, Operation Streamline received a 
significant ruling against its practice in the Tucson Sector . 
Judge John Noonan, from the US Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, ruled that the mass hearings, in which mul-
tiple defendants are asked to respond to questions together, 
does not comply with federal court rules .37 The outcome 
however, has not seen the end of Operation Streamline, 
or its daily hearings of undocumented migrants en masse, 
but merely a slightly altered approach in questioning and 
process .
Creating Demand for Immigrant Detention and 
the Growth of the Prison-Industrial Complex
Practices of hyper-criminalization and mass incarceration 
of migrants come at a cost not only to those who are appre-
hended . Though a relatively recent development in Arizona, 
the application of Operation Streamline has taken a sig-
nificant toll on the legal system . With a goal of up to one 
hundred migrants being prosecuted a day (though presently 
at sixty to seventy), courtrooms must be set aside, attor-
neys hired, judges paid for, and the costs of transporting 
migrants and detaining them throughout the process paid . 
Derechos Humanos, a grassroots immigrant rights pro-
ject in Tucson, Arizona, has estimated that it costs around 
US$9 to US$11 million a month to detain those incarcer-
ated under Operation Streamline .38 Another US$10,000 a 
day is spent on defense attorneys, given that migrants can-
not afford to pay for one . Meanwhile, it is estimated that it 
costs around US$88 a day to house a prisoner in privately 
run facilities, and US$120 a day at ICE processing centres .39 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), under the 
US government, is also setting aside further funds for this 
growing prison population:
Nationwide, the average number of daily prisoners detained by 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement [ … ] has now increased 
44 percent since 2001 [ … ]Meanwhile, ICE’s budget for Detention 
and Removal Operations has more than doubled in the last four 
years [ … ] to $2 .4 billion in 2008 .40
Though migrants are often detained in for-profit federal 
prisons run by Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) 
and existing detention centres in Arizona (and often outside 
of this state), many of these facilities are at, or beyond, cap-
acity . There is a growing demand then for additional deten-
tion facilities to be built in order to house the significant 
number of new detainees, alongside the many women and 
men currently being detained from workplace and domicile 
raids taking place across the United States at unprecedented 
levels by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
officers .41
Operation Streamline has played a significant role in the 
growth of incarceration facilities in Del Rio, Texas, where 
the program was first implemented in 2005 at a much smaller 
scale . Initially applied to a golf course that encompassed a 
quarter-mile stretch of the border, Operation Streamline 
was soon expanded to the entire sector .42 Apprehension lev-
els by the USBP within the Del Rio Sector are supposedly at 
their lowest since the early 1970s, a sign that earlier enforce-
ment efforts have likely channelled people elsewhere along 
the border .
Significantly, as apprehension levels drop to all-time lows 
across the border, incarceration rates are at their highest . 
This is demonstrated by the growth of prisons and deten-
tion centres in the Del Rio, Texas region, such as Val Verde 
Correctional Facility . In 2000, Val Verde had a capacity of 
180 beds, but now has the ability to hold 1,425 prisoners .43 
Most of these additional spaces are used to imprison immi-
grant detainees .
In addition to the growth of Val Verde, new prisons 
have been erected close to the Mexico-US border in Texas, 
including a 654-bed jail in Eagle Pass and a 1,500-bed 
prison in Laredo, a sector in which Operation Streamline 
is now also in effect . All of these prisons—Val Verde 
included—are privately run by Geo Group Inc . (previously 
Wackenhut), a security company known for running deten-
tion centres across the globe, as well as the buses that shut-
tle migrants apprehended by USBP to processing centres 
throughout the southwest .44 Meredith Kolodner, reporting 
for the New York Times in 2006, noted these growing con-
nections between the prison industrial complex (PIC) and 
immigrant detention very clearly . By fall of 2007, Kolodner 
reported, it was expected that “27,500 immigrants will be in 
detention each night .”45 At that time, CCA and Geo Group 
were housing less than 20 per cent of all detained migrants, 
but were running eight of sixteen federal detention cen-
tres and looking to expand further . By 2008, the number 
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of immigrant detainees increased to 32,000 being detained 
nightly throughout the United States, and 300,000 detained 
annually . Indeed, immigrant detention is “the fastest-grow-
ing sector of the US prison population .”46
Several other shifts within US immigration and deten-
tion policies, led largely by the DHS and CBP (though often 
at the Sector level), have further supported the growth of 
incarceration . Of particular significance has been the ter-
mination of what was referred to as a “catch and release” 
policy, in which non-Mexican persons (referred to by USBP 
as “OTMs,” or “other than Mexicans”) detained in the US 
for entering illegally were typically released and given a 
court appearance date, due to a lack of space within deten-
tion facilities .47 This new policy to end the practice of catch 
and release has taken place under the wider program of 
“Operation Endgame” (in collaboration with Operation 
Streamline and other policies), in which ICE plans to 
remove all removable undocumented migrants residing in 
the United States by 2012 .48 Though a seemingly impossible 
goal, its impact upon migrant communities throughout the 
US is significant, and has further generated a demand for 
new detention facilities . It can be argued, then, that the cre-
ation of new and ever more draconian policies that seek to 
detain and deport undocumented migrants in mass num-
bers goes hand in hand with the dramatic growth of the 
prison industrial complex throughout the United States .
No More Deaths—“Humanitarian Aid Is Never  
a Crime”
In 2004, the humanitarian aid group No More Deaths, 
based in Tucson, Arizona, began their “Arc of the Covenant” 
camps . During the summer months, from June through the 
end of September, a base camp is set up on private property 
near to Arivaca, an unincorporated township in Arizona 
approximately twelve miles north of the Mexico-US border . 
Each week new volunteers arrive at the camp to work with 
more experienced, year-round members . Patrols leave twice 
daily from the base camp—in the early mornings and late 
afternoons to avoid the hottest part of the day—and drive 
out to some of the myriad of trails that criss-cross the desert 
landscape . Trails are meticulously mapped by GPS, and then 
rated—a score of “1” if the trail appears no longer in use and 
up to “5” for trails where migrants are actually encountered 
frequently . With maps, GPS units, medical equipment, food, 
and water, volunteers hike the trails for three hours or more, 
placing gallon water jugs along their way, and calling out to 
alert migrants that they are there to provide assistance and 
are not working with the Border Patrol .
Groups such as No More Deaths (NMD), which developed 
out of the Sanctuary Movement in the 1980s,49 commonly 
do not espouse an explicit No Borders agenda; however the 
work that they carry out in solidarity with undocumented 
people most affected by the militarization of the Mexico-US 
borderlands is of particular importance . There are a sig-
nificant range of viewpoints and beliefs witnessed in both 
short- and long-term volunteers involved with NMD . These 
certainly encompass a critical perspective regarding free-
dom of movement . Importantly, NMD works tirelessly to 
provide solidarity and support to those attempting to cross 
the Sonoran Desert into the US and is not concerned with 
furthering the common dichotomy of legal/illegal . Instead, 
NMD recognizes that it is the largely unchallenged practice 
of border militarization and denial of freedom of movement 
that is leading to exceptional levels of abuse and death in the 
borderlands every day .50
Those patrolling the trails generally see migrants on 
an infrequent basis, though on occasion some patrols will 
meet several groups within the space of a few hours . Due to 
issues of safety, NMD patrols do not operate at night when 
migrants are most likely to be on the move . It is therefore 
accepted that most groups will remain out of sight during 
the day, choosing not to be found . Encounters with USBP 
are rare when patrolling the trails, as most agents wait along 
the roadsides where trails must eventually cross, though it is 
not uncommon to have low-flying Border Patrol helicopters 
passing overhead .
Over the past five summers of operation, NMD has 
encountered repression from USBP, from government agen-
cies such as the Bureau of Land Management, and from 
ranchers and hunters . At the most basic level, gallon water 
jugs that volunteers leave along trails are found with large 
gash marks in the bottom to drain the water out . Though 
causing little impact on NMD, this can result in those 
who are most in need of water being denied such a neces-
sary basis of life . Interactions with USBP and BORSTAR51 
agents range from courteous (sometimes even giving direc-
tions to lost agents), to strained, particularly when a tense 
medical situation requiring evacuation takes place . A strict 
policy of transparency is maintained by NMD at all times 
to ensure the safety of volunteers and migrants, aware that 
its operations are possibly under the watchful eye of USBP 
agents and the DHS . This practice of transparency, includ-
ing frequent meetings with the USBP Chief of the Tucson 
Sector, has not ended the close surveillance of NMD . For 
example, agents have at times been deployed around the 
clock to watch the base camp from a nearby hillside .
One example of an encounter that volunteers have with 
other law enforcement agencies occurred on February 22, 
2008, when long-time volunteer Dan Millis and several 
others were placing water on the Buenos Aires National 
Wildlife Refuge (BANWR) and collecting refuse left 
behind by migrant groups . After several years of walking 
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the heavily crossed 118,000-acre Refuge and leaving water 
behind with few problems, Millis was ticketed by two US 
Fish and Wildlife agents for the act of littering .52 In response 
to the citation that Millis received, NMD decided to chal-
lenge the littering citation in court—the same court in 
which Operation Streamline hearings take place—thereby 
entailing a potential risk of up to US$5,000 in fines and pos-
sible jail time . The judge finally reached a verdict sixty days 
after the hearing, finding Millis guilty of littering, though 
he did not fine the long-term volunteer .53 This set a preced-
ent so that other volunteers have also been cited for littering . 
It appears this will create added difficulties for humanitar-
ian aid groups in this critical corridor where several thou-
sand migrants cross each week . As one reporter stated in an 
opinion piece, the magistrate and officers appear to prefer 
the recovering of bodies rather than a small amount of addi-
tional litter on the Refuge .54
The Impacts of Operation Streamline  
outside the Courthouse
Along with the significant importance and impact of 
Operation Streamline proceedings upon migrants within 
the courtroom and detention centres, it is also necessary 
to understand the impacts of such a policy on the ground . 
Operation Streamline, along with other policies of spatial 
confinement, places additional strain on migrant bodies 
and minds even if they are not caught up in the Operation 
Streamline process . This is because these practices are poli-
cies of deterrence, which are intended to create extra hard-
ships for those entering the US without legal documents . 
Through the creation of the fear of possible incarceration, 
such policies should be seen as effective in restricting 
freedom of movement whether persons are apprehended 
or not .55 The work of No More Deaths, alongside several 
other humanitarian aid groups within the desert corridor 
in which Operation Streamline is applied, supports these 
assertions .
As practices of militarization, policing, and height-
ened criminalization of migrants continue to develop, the 
space of the borderlands becomes increasingly threatening . 
Meanwhile, as knowledge amongst coyotes and migrants 
alike (particularly repeat crossers) spreads regarding 
Operation Streamline, and the likelihood of spending up to 
180 days in a federal prison grows, migration paths and prac-
tices will begin to shift once more . One outcome is to push 
migrants and their guides into less-charted territories that 
are often significantly more perilous .56 This is demonstrated 
by the coyotes’ use of increasingly mountainous trails that 
offer more protection from being seen by USBP . During the 
summer of 2008, several months after the implementation 
of Operation Streamline, humanitarian aid groups began 
to note that more traditional trails used by migrants were 
being abandoned . Instead, trails through the nearby and 
treacherous Baboquivari and Tumacacori mountains were 
beginning to be traversed more heavily . Further, encoun-
ters with migrant groups in this region demonstrated that 
migrants were walking for greater times due to efforts to 
stay in higher elevation and more densely vegetated areas . 
Many migrants were discovered only several miles from 
the border, but relayed to volunteers that their guides had 
made them walk for over four days in the mountains . Many 
had given up, convinced their guides were lost . These efforts 
to remain out of sight are undoubtedly due to the general 
concern of avoiding apprehension by USBP, but may also be 
seen as an effort to avoid the added risk and penalty of being 
put through the criminal justice system .
Efforts to remain out of sight are also combined with the 
pressure to continue walking against better judgment in 
order to avoid the possibility of incarceration and further 
criminalization through Operation Streamline and similar 
policies .57 The most common occurrence for humanitar-
ian aid groups when patrolling trails and nearby roads is to 
encounter individual migrants separated from their group, 
often in poor health due to factors such as dehydration or 
hyperthermia, having drunk water from a contaminated 
cattle tank, or with sprained or broken ankles from hik-
ing through rough terrain . Typically, volunteers inform 
migrants of their options: keep walking, rest at the base 
camp of the humanitarian aid group if possible, or hand 
themselves over to USBP, be returned back across the bor-
der (if they are a Mexican national), and try again with a 
new guide . After migrants were told how far they still had to 
walk, they often chose the latter option of giving themselves 
up to USBP . This was usually their best and safest option, 
particularly if alone, injured, or sick . From there they could 
be voluntarily returned and reunite with their coyote to try 
once again, or return home if the experience had been too 
traumatic or if they had run out of money .
With the advent of Operation Streamline at the begin-
ning of 2008, however, aid workers found themselves con-
fronted with a difficult situation . Interactions with migrants 
are typically short, under pressure not to draw attention 
from Border Patrol agents, and with the desire of migrants 
(and coyotes) to keep moving . Volunteers typically must 
explain to migrants their options in as detailed manner as 
possible, often on a roadside or deep within the desert on a 
trail, with temperatures often exceeding 110ºF (43ºC) in the 
summer months . Since the implementation of Operation 
Streamline, aid workers found that they must also explain 
that if they turn themselves in to USBP, the migrant may 
find themselves within the system established through 
Operation Streamline and thus face possible jail time along 
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with a criminal conviction . Given that on average the USBP 
puts sixty to seventy migrants a day through Operation 
Streamline, and that they apprehend approximately one 
thousand people per day within the Tucson Sector, the odds 
of going through Operation Streamline are high . Many 
migrants, upon learning of these risks, decide that hand-
ing themselves over to USBP is too risky . The possibility 
of incarceration, then, often resulted in migrants continu-
ing to walk, sometimes against the advice of humanitarian 
workers (who are commonly trained as Wilderness First 
Responders or Emergency Medical Technicians) .
Thus, the work that Operation Streamline does, long 
before migrants find themselves in the courtroom, becomes 
apparent: the migrant may never end up in court pleading 
guilty to the relatively minor infraction of crossing undocu-
mented, but risks further long-term injury or death due to 
their efforts at avoiding apprehension . Simply handing one-
self over to USBP, being processed and returned, and trying 
again within a day or two, or sometimes even that same day, 
is becoming less of a realistic option .58
To further confound efforts to return into the US, the 
USBP also applies the practice of repatriation flights as well 
as “lateral repatriations .” Supposedly voluntary repatria-
tion flights are offered to migrants59 free of charge, allowing 
them to return much closer to their hometowns in southern 
Mexico and beyond, though it has been noted that this option 
is more commonly forced upon migrants .60 For those who 
refuse this service, and many others who are not given the 
option, the use of lateral repatriation and other methods are 
used to create greater headaches in attempting to cross once 
more .61 Migrants have relayed to volunteers working with 
NMD and other organizations that instead of being returned 
close to where they crossed or were apprehended, they were 
instead bused many hours to other ports of entry before 
being returned to Mexico . This practice is often described as 
being in the best interest of migrants, as the following state-
ment from a CBP press release demonstrates:
The Alien Transfer Exit Program [ATEP] safely returned 5,380 
illegal aliens through ports of entry in California [from Arizona] . 
This program safely removed aliens from the waiting hands of 
the smugglers who would certainly force them to endure several 
days in the harsh environment in another attempt to illegally 
cross the border only to face certainty of arrest by Border Patrol 
agents .62
Volunteers staffing border aid stations at various ports of 
entry in southern Arizona/northern Sonora, where upwards 
of one thousand migrants a day can be voluntarily returned, 
also frequently witness the return and deportation of separ-
ated family members, where one member is returned later 
than another, or is sent to a different port of entry . Women 
and children are also often returned alone at night, a direct 
breach of USBP policy .
Responding to Operation Streamline as a Practice 
of Everyday State Violence
It is important to understand the direct and indirect impacts 
of Operation Streamline—in collaboration with other poli-
cies and practices of border militarization—upon the work 
of No More Deaths and other humanitarian aid groups 
committed to promoting freedom of movement and provid-
ing aid to migrants in the Sonoran Desert . Groups such as 
these must respond to such policies creatively if they are to 
effectively provide aid in the dynamic space of the border-
lands in which restrictive policies affect not only migrants 
but also those working in solidarity with them . How might 
groups like NMD overcome such prohibitive measures 
implemented by the state, measures that guarantee hardship 
and death for those passing through these spaces?
Given that NMD and similar groups operate strictly 
within the deadliest corridor of the border,63 and particu-
larly within the scope of Operation Streamline’s spatial 
reach, combatting such impacts is central . With the less-
ening ability to offer the option of contacting the USBP for 
migrants no longer able to continue to safely walk north 
(though by no means an ideal situation), and increasing 
criminalization of anyone found to be aiding in the trans-
portation of migrants north, humanitarian aid groups have 
been forced to consider other means of keeping those in 
vulnerable positions outside of the Operation Streamline 
dragnet . One such option debated by NMD over the 
summer of 2008 was to drive migrants south with their 
informed consent and to aid the migrants in self-deporting 
themselves across the border to reconnect with a guide or 
family members and friends who had also been returned 
or deported . Though such practices of “driving south” may 
work to operate in solidarity with migrants, allowing them 
to avoid the risk of a criminal record, time in detention, 
and possible abuse at the hands of USBP or private secur-
ity agents, critical reflection on what this strategy means 
on a larger scale was required for the group . What does it 
mean for a grassroots network of humanitarian workers 
to be driving migrants south, on the one hand providing 
assistance in avoiding further criminalization, whilst also 
tacitly acting to support other processes of spatial denial 
implemented by the US government? If such groups were 
to be driving migrants south, would this mean they were 
operating in a role similar to that of USBP and private 
security contractors, whose very means of existence is to 
take migrants south, further from their goal of entry into 
the United States?
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Alongside this concern, it was not easy to establish 
whether or not driving migrants south, to be self-deported, 
was actually a legal practice . Given that the DHS had made 
it very clear they would no longer allow medical evacuations 
by humanitarian aid workers or other civilians in which 
migrants had to be driven north to a hospital—following 
the court case involving two NMD volunteers in 2005–6 for 
doing just that64—there was considerable concern as to what 
the response by DHS would be to driving migrants south, 
allowing them to avoid the government’s new program 
of hyper-criminalization through Operation Streamline . 
This remains an unresolved and problematic position for 
humanitarian aid groups working in the Tucson Sector . It 
must be noted however, that No More Deaths have never 
adopted within their protocols to drive persons south, but 
rather this practice has remained only at the level of discus-
sion during meetings .
Similar questions regarding the legality of actions are 
not new to NMD or similar organizations providing aid in 
the Mexico-US borderlands . Given the myriad law enforce-
ment agencies active in this region, changing state and fed-
eral policies, as well as differing sentiment towards volun-
teers from USBP agents and the public, it is often difficult 
to determine what is within the scope of the law . Further, 
and in light of the groups’ position that “humanitarian aid 
is never a crime,” members of NMD often debate whether it 
is breaking the law to provide humanitarian assistance, and 
if it is in turn beneficial to their cause to be fined or arrested, 
due to the media attention that such events draw .65
The devolution of immigration law to the state and local 
level has resulted in very specific conditions within vary-
ing spaces along the border as well as internally throughout 
the United States . This is clearly demonstrated by the adop-
tion of Operation Streamline and similar zero-tolerance 
policies, in which certain USBP sectors decide whether or 
not to apply the “uneven spatiality of immigration enforce-
ment .”66 In her recent article regarding this practice of 
devolution, Monica Varsanyi67 discusses the legal (re)pro-
duction of scale used to discern who belongs within the US 
and who does not . Importantly, she notes that by allowing 
this devolution, the federal government may continue to 
appear tough on border enforcement, while leaving the 
work of policing undocumented migration to the state 
and local levels . This devolution of immigration powers is 
not complete though, as Varsanyi reminds us, but rather 
“a partial, incomplete, and contingent devolution,” where 
the federal government still maintains overall say .68 As 
I have discussed earlier, such an approach also results in 
the differential criminalization of migrants for the same 
act of crossing undocumented, as it is dependent upon the 
place in which they decide to cross . This in turn creates 
a unique set of constraints for humanitarian aid work-
ers depending also on their location . For example, those 
providing water in the Calexico region of the San Diego 
Sector, as well as those crossing there, are not affected by 
Operation Streamline, yet slightly further east in the Yuma 
Sector the policy of Operation Streamline applies .69 Such 
programs, therefore, are part of the state’s spatial redirec-
tion of people’s movements .
Of particular concern for those promoting freedom 
of movement within the Mexico-US borderlands, and in 
particular the Tucson Sector, is the seemingly legitimated 
and everyday nature of Operation Streamline, one that 
continues to expand with little awareness or contestation 
from citizens residing in this region . Meanwhile, attacks 
upon the legitimacy of the provision of humanitarian aid 
continue, forcing such groups to repeatedly justify their 
means for doing the work they believe to be necessary . 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, providing a gallon of water to a 
group of people desperately in need of it becomes infin-
itely more problematic than the criminalization, incar-
ceration, and possible death of that same group . Without 
the ongoing contestation of border militarization strat-
egies, including Operation Streamline, and protesting of 
the continually growing death toll, such geographies of 
violence will continue to remain justified in the eyes of 
the state and much of its citizenry . This structural form 
of violence70 created by CBP and USBP agents, the federal 
government, and vigilante groups, continues to demon-
strate that the ongoing policing of undocumented migra-
tion, and practices of border militarization, are not con-
cerned with the humanitarian impacts of immigration 
policy . Instead they are committed to failed policies of 
deterrence, which do not address the root causes of migra-
tion, but rather shore up the conditions which inevitably 
lead to abuses and death . As Fernandez, et al . so deftly 
note: “… human[s] who move [ … ] without state author-
ization challenge [ … ] human rights discourses by reveal-
ing the dependence of such discourses on the sovereignty 
of the nation-state .”71
Humanitarian groups such as NMD, as well as immi-
grant rights groups in a similar context, recognize that the 
work they do in the deserts of the Mexico-US borderlands 
will not solve the issue of undocumented migration and 
its attendant abuses and deaths . It is frequently cited by 
long-term volunteers, many of whom were involved in the 
Sanctuary Movement in the 1980s, that providing humani-
tarian aid is a band-aid solution, yet it is a necessary one 
at this present moment . No amount of water placed out in 
the desert will put an end to the deaths or prevent migrants 
from being incarcerated for increasingly lengthy periods 
of time . Yet the continued presence of volunteers, year 
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after year, has ensured that many thousands of migrants 
have been provided with some level of assistance and soli-
darity that they would otherwise not have received at the 
hands of USBP agents, or if left alone to die in the desert . 
Volunteers are often reminded to reflect upon their privil-
ege of freedom of movement within the highly militarized 
borderland region, and how to use that privilege in a man-
ner which best allows them to work alongside those who are 
denied such rights . As Jennifer Hyndman reminds us, the 
mobility of humanitarian aid is “juxtaposed with the rela-
tive immobility of migrants … generating two distinct but 
related geographies .”72
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